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The third and most important reason against facile comparisons of the two theories is that Schenker's theory is organized along the lines of Figure 2 , not of Figure 1 . That is, insofar as his theory is formal rather than just a repository of analytic procedures, it proceeds from underlying axioms (the Klang and Ursatz) through various elaborational rules to the musical surface. He does not intend, as we do, a theory that models the listener's intuition by predicting analyses from musical surfaces. His primary purpose is correspondingly not psychological but aesthetic. As long as the steps of derivation are lawful, actual derivations remain unspecified by his theory, this function being taken over instead by the analyst's aesthetic judgment. In the Schenkerian paradigm, then, disputed analyses boil down to value judgments within a systematic framework. In our paradigm, by contrast, unsatisfactory analyses demand improvements in the rule system itself, since it is this rather than the analyst that assigns analyses. There is no Schenkerian counterpart to our musical grammar.
We From a psychological viewpoint, the most crucial of these questions is (1), since Schenker seems to claim that humans are innately endowed with Ursatz-schema to which they try to fit musical surfaces. Such an attitude does not comport well with contemporary views on the nature of the mind, and is refuted by the historical and ethnomusicological evidence. Schenker aside, we challenge those who propose models along the lines of 273-277, 340) . Similarly, it was beyond our intent fully to quantify the PRs (pp. 53-55). But this does not mean that the PR system is unstructured. In introducing a new rule, we discuss its range of applicability, its relative strength, and aspects of its interaction with other rules. Thus, as mentioned above, TSRPR 2 overrides TSRPRs 1 and 3, but conditions (a) and (b) of TSRPR 2 compete closely. Through such distinctions in the course of a derivation, Examples 1 and 8 become "preferred," Example 3 and P & S's Example 3 become "not preferred," and so forth. Though a full characterization of the PR system awaits further research, the system is already highly organized.
P & S's more sweeping claim is that, whereas our grammar relies on PRs within the framework of well-formedness rules (WFRs), a generative theory should in principle use only WFRs (P & S, p. 288). We should explain here that WFRs provide admissible, or "grammatical," descriptions; PRs select the most "coherent" among grammatical descriptions. WFRs are categorical: either a sequence is grammatical and II-(0,1,2,3 )-V progression is tonally ill-formed and would not receive a description. P & S might fall back on the position that Example 10 involves voice-leading and not a harmonic progression. However, then they would need both wellformed voice-leading criteria and a method for not assigning chord labels to triadic constructions under specified conditions. Regarding voice leading, some criteria may indeed involve well-formedness, such as the resolving of a suspension; however, others are not mandatory but rather more Gestalt-like, such as the filling in of a gap after a leap. The latter can be explicated only by recourse to PRs. As for chord labels, Winograd found that musical passages can have many well-formed roman-numeral analyses (for instance, the beginning of "O Haupt" can be represented in G major!); so he had to develop "semantic rules"-in effect, PRs-to select the most coherent analyses. 8 We take a similar view. The same argument holds for P & S's claim that a VI cannot replace a I at the end of a piece: does that make Chopin's Mazurka in A Minor, Op. 17 No. 4, ungrammatical( No-it is just unusual, and must be assigned structure by a generative theory of tonal music. P & S's grammar fails even for the examples they offer.
One might ask why musical syntax cannot be as fully captured by WFRs as linguistic syntax. We think there are two fundamental reasons: unlike language, music is not made up of grammatical categories that combine in highly constrained ways (GTTM, pp. 112-113); and music is not limited by such semantic considerations as sense and reference (GTTM, pp. 5-6). As a result, music is more able than language to be construed in a multiplicity of ways, in varying degrees of coherence (GTTM, p. 9). The relative lack of well-formedness constraints in music is compensated for by the rich and linguistically unparalleled interaction among the various musical dimensions, including the four hierarchical organizations addressed by our theory.
This brings us to P & S's second principled objection, that the Strong Reduction Hypothesis (strict nesting of pitch hierarchies) is too strong a criterion for reductions. They believe the inclusion of "crossed" hierarchies would be more realistic (P & S, p. 290) . However, they incorrectly suggest (pp. 290-291) that we want to exclude nonnested structures from music. We in fact call attention to the nonhierarchical aspects of pitch structure (GTTM, pp. 7, 9, 52-53, 116-117, 286-287; depending on context, we refer to "motivic-thematic," "linear-motivic," or "associational" organization). The impact of these aspects on hierarchical structure is encoded in the parallelism rules for each component. So the issue is not the existence of nonnested pitch structures but how to treat them theoretically.
We 5. Universals. P & S's treatment of our views on musical universals and contemporary music is particularly misleading. Our concern is not with cultural but with psychological universals-the mental principles by which humans organize musical stimuli. This point is treated in some detail in sections 11.1-2, to which P & S make no reference. In the rule index (GTTM, pp. 345-352) we distinguish between those principles of our grammar that we think are universal and those that are specific to idioms.
For example, if an idiom has harmony, the harmonic aspects of the reductional components come into play; that is, to the extent that the signal permits, the listener tries (unconsciously) to infer harmonic hierarchies. Those Throughout, P & S tend improperly to inject issues of aesthetic value. For example, they go out of their way to paint our theory as biased toward symmetry, even though our prolongational component is no less asymmetrical than Schenker's. The issue in any case is not one of value but of how listeners organize musical surfaces. We offer evidence that in certain respects listeners seek symmetrical structures, everything else being equal (GTTM, pp. 49-50, 99-101, 136-137) . A comparable claim in visual psychology would be unexceptionable enough. Is P & S's problem with the term "preference"? If so, we must emphasize that it refers to the noncategorical nature of PRs rather than aesthetic preference (GTTM, pp. 42, 336). Or do they just dislike the notion that listeners intuitively organize surfaces in particular ways?
Similarly, our discussion of contemporary music is aesthetically neutral. P & S attribute to us the position that "if a piece of music cannot be demonstrated to possess the nested hierarchies in the four realms they have described . . . then the piece is at best superficial" (p. 291). In fact we take no such position, particularly in the aesthetic sense of "superficial," and we take pains to distance ourselves from aesthetic judgment. Rather, our claim is that some recent music does not permit listeners to infer much hierarchical structure, regardless of the technique by which it has been composed. We explore this situation in some detail from the vantage of our grammar, and note that the nonhierarchical dimensions have played a compensatory role (GTTM, pp. 296-300).12 But the absence of heard hierarchy, which is so central to comprehension and memory (GTTM, p. 241), is, we believe, a fundamental cause of the difficulty in understanding this music-certainly as important a cause as the social factors against which P & S plead. However, no value judgment is implied. The relation between accessibility and value is at best indirect; nobody has proposed a serious theory about such matters (GTTM, p. 301). To maintain a direct correlation would be to argue that some Vivaldi concerto is better than Pierrot Lunaire but worse than the latest rock album. We do not take such a view. NOTES 
